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As there are more and more investors in financial markets investing indirectly 
through mutual fund, pension fund and insurance fund, institutional investors have 
replaced the role of individual investors to become the dominant investors in financial 
markets. An accompanying change of the preponderance of delegated investing is that 
agent’s (institutional investors or investment managers) objective function plays a more 
important role in asset pricing and market efficiency than individual investor’s utility 
function. That is to say: the investment decisions made by investment managers are not 
only restricted by bounded rationality as referred in behavioral finance, but also 
influenced by moral hazard caused in delegated investments when investment managers 
pursue the maximization of their personal benefits. Moral hazard in delegated 
investments badly hurts principals directly as well as brings profound and complex 
influence to market efficiency. Therefore, it is both theoretically and practically 
meaningful to study this issue. 
Compared with individual investors, institutional investors behave more 
consistently with the assumption of “rational investor” in Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
However, does it mean the financial market will become more efficient since 
institutional investors become the mainstream in the market? The dissertation conducts 
a systematic study into this question. It constructs models to fully analyze the restriction 
mechanism and negative influence on improving the market information efficiency 
imposed by principal-agent structure between investors and investment managers and 
the moral hazard, institutional herding and limited arbitrage arising in delegated 
investments. Based on this analysis, this dissertation questions the three 
efficiency-reducing assumptions about the role of institutional investors on market 
efficiency.  
After discussing the influence of delegated investment on market efficiency and 
pricing efficiency, this dissertation shifts to focus on China’s capital market. Since the 
institutional investors like securities investment fund develop so fast in China, what has 














examines the forms of moral hazard in securities investment fund and its influence on 
market efficiency, builds models to analyze the vicious circle of the mutual influence 
between short-termism of the fund investors and short-termism of the fund managers. 
The voting scandals in the process of stock structure reform made people to doubt about 
the proposition that institutional investors are capable of monitoring and reducing the 
private benefits of control held by controlling shareholders and corporate managers so 
as to enhance corporate governance and improve monitoring efficiency. Through model 
analysis, this dissertation presents the collusion and non-collusion strategies by 
investment manager and corporate manager and its respective influence on private 
benefits of control of corporate. And the dissertation proposes some measures to this 
problem. While the moral hazard in delegated investments brings negative influence on 
the information efficiency and function efficiency of the market. In order to maintain 
the orderly operation of the financial market, we can deal with the agency problem 
through contract design and fund governance. The last part of this dissertation discuss 
about how to improve fund governance mechanism and fund management fees 
designing so as to reduce the negative influence of moral hazard brought by investment 
fund on the financial market efficiency. 
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导  言 
- 1 - 
导  言 
第一节  选题背景 
一、代理投资的兴起：国际趋势与中国现状 
20 世纪 70 年代以来，机构投资者迅速崛起，并逐渐成为金融市场投资的主导
力量①。越来越多的家庭通过共同基金、养老基金和保险公司等机构投资者的代理
投资（Delegated Investment）间接地参与金融市场。根据美国投资公司协会











资料来源：Investment Company Institute , Equity Ownership in America, 2005， www.ici.org 
 
在美国，共同基金在家庭金融资产总额中所占的比重也是逐年上升，已由 1990
年的 6.8％上升到 2004 年的 19.5%（参见图 0－2）。除了共同基金外，2004 年美国















Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
